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Abstract 
The Czech National Bank has a respectable track record in terms of its policy actions and 
the corresponding inflation outturns. We analyze its main communication tools – inflation 
targets, inflation forecasts, verbal assessments of the inflation risks contained in quarter-
ly inflation reports, and the voting within the CNB Board  – to  assess clarity of com- 
munication. We find that these tools provided a very clear message in about three out of 
every four observations in our 2001–2005 sample.
1. Introduction 
The Czech National Bank (CNB) – an inflation targeter since 1998 – has scored 
high among the most transparent central banks (Fracasso et al., 2003), largely be-
cause the CNB is open and discloses a lot of information in a timely manner through 
inflation reports, minutes of policy meetings, and other channels. We argue, how-
ever, that monetary policy transparency has one additional, difficult-to-measure di-
mension, namely, clarity. A central bank that discloses quickly large volumes of in-
formation that are not “crystal clear”, that is, unambiguously interpretable by the pu-
blic, is not transparent even though it may be “clearly open” about its actions. We 
illustrate that Czech monetary policy communication can be classified not only as 
open and timely, but also as very clear most of the time. Our policy conclusion is 
that openness of monetary policy communication is not a sufficient condition for trans-
parency. 
Empirical studies evaluating central bank transparency have so  far worked 
almost exclusively with two dimensions only, namely, openness and timeliness. Mo-
netary policy communication is said to be open when as much information as pos-
sible is disclosed (“clearly open”). Communication is timely when information is dis-
closed fast enough for the public to make use of it. In contrast, the third dimension – 
clarity of communication – has rarely been explored in studies to date, in part be-
cause it is more difficult to measure than the other two dimensions (Woodford, 2005). 
The empirical contribution of this paper is to suggest a way of m easuring 
clarity  of  communication  by  looking  at  alternative  measures  of  forecast  risk  that 
the public can obtain from central bank communication. For example, the public may 
learn from the inflation report that the central inflation forecast is 3 % for next year 
but that the risks are biased upwards. Other things being equal, this would lead 
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the public to deduce that if inflation deviates from the central forecast, the devia-
tion is more likely to be on the upside. Other communication tools, such as minutes, 
speeches, interviews, and so on, can send either the same message or a different one 
about the forecast risk. We argue that it is much easier for the public to understand 
monetary policy if all communications send the same, crystal clear message, pointing 
to the same type of forecast risk. If, in contrast, alternative communications point in 
different directions, the public is likely to misunderstand monetary policy. Incon-
sistency between communication tools limits clarity and therefore also one dimen-
sion of transparency, irrespective of the volume of information disclosed. 
We apply our measurement of transparency to Czech data. We first survey 
the various  communication  tools  used  by  the CNB.  We  then  compare  them  with 
the communication tools recommended in benchmark studies to evaluate the relative 
openness and timeliness of CNB communication. Finally, we compute three alter-
native  measures  of  the expected  deviation of  inflation from  the central  forecast  – 
based on various communication tools – and look at their mutual consistency. These 
calculations enable us to evaluate the clarity of CNB communication and we con-
clude that it is indeed high. Since we find that the CNB is also open and timely in its 
communication, we conclude that Czech monetary policy is transparent.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we summarize the methodological 
framework for the analysis of monetary policy transparency. Second, we evaluate 
the openness and timeliness of CNB communication. Third, we outline our metho-
dology for assessing communication clarity. Fourth, we present the Czech empirical 
results. The final part concludes. 
2. Transparency: Open, Timely, and Clear Communication 
Inflation targeting has several important attributes that distinguish it from al-
ternative monetary strategies. It is a forward-looking strategy that (i) employs expli-
cit inflation targets and inflation forecasts
1 in order to stabilize inflation expectations, 
and (ii) is performed in an open and transparent manner (Bernanke et al., 1999). We 
see a general and growing consensus among both academic researchers and central 
bankers that the latter point, that is, transparency, is crucial to the success of inflation 
targeting. We see, however, much less consensus on why it is crucial to be trans-
parent, what exactly transparency is, and how it can be measured. This section is 
devoted to clarifying these two issues in order to develop a conceptual framework for 
the analysis of communication strategy. 
Let us summarize the arguments for transparency. The three common argu-
ments are: (i) maintaining the independence of the central bank, (ii) directly enhanc-
ing  its  macroeconomic  performance, a nd  (iii) building  the credibility  of  monetary 
policy to indirectly enhance macroeconomic performance. According to the first ar-
gument, target and policy communication ensure that the central bank can be held 
1 Although we speak about inflation forecasts, we assume in this paper that the central bank produces 
forecasts for other important economic variables (not just inflation), such as economic growth and interest
and  exchange  rate  paths.  When  we  speak  about  publishing  inflation  forecasts,  we  again  assume  that 
the central bank publishes forecasts of other variables (not just inflation). It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to go into more detail and discuss which parts of the forecast should be published. However, two 
other papers in this volume focus on exactly this problem (Apel, Vredin, 2007), and (Filáþek et al., 2007). 
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accountable, in turn guaranteeing public support for its independence (Bernanke et 
al., 1999). According to the second argument, higher transparency should be directly 
associated with better economic performance, as well-informed financial markets are 
better able to predict monetary policy actions, thus minimizing the damage of policy 
surprises (Blinder et al., 2001). There seems to be empirical evidence of this direct link; 
see, for example, the cross-country analysis in (Chortareas et al., 2002) or the New 
Zealand case study of Drew and Karagedilki (2007). Filáþek et al. (2007) found that 
transparency enhances the expectations channel of monetary transmission. 
The final argument of credibility building combines the two above arguments 
for transparency: a well-communicating central bank needs to be able to explain to 
the public its views on current and future economic conditions, its own actions, and 
the outcomes of these actions (Heenan et al., 2006), (Apel, Vredin, 2007). In doing so, 
the central bank ensures that monetary policy stays credible even if inflation deviates 
from the target, due to nonmonetary shocks. In other words, the success of the inflation 
targeting strategy is not measured by inflation staying close to the target, but by stabili-
ty of the macroeconomic environment and credibility of monetary policy. Empirically, 
more credible central banks have been found to have lower costs of disinflation (BulíĜ,
Hurník, 2006) and their credibility comes partly from communicating their policy in-
tentions correctly. Not all central banks communicate well, however, the CNB seems to 
be doing well in comparison to other Central European banks (Rozkrut et al., 2007). 
For the purposes of this paper, we find the third argument to be the most im-
portant: an inflation-targeting central bank communicates well if the public is able to 
understand the current monetary stance as well as the most likely direction thereof in 
the near future.
2 We hasten to add that better transparency does not necessarily or al-
ways imply more inflation predictability, owing to the nonmonetary shocks that may 
hit the economy (Eijffinnger, Geraats, 2006). Moreover, a more transparent central 
bank  may  decide  to  communicate  additional  uncertainty  about  its  forecast,  in  turn 
“clouding the future” for all those trying to guess it from central bank communication. 
There are diminishing returns to openness as far as direct and indirect en-
hancements of economic performance are concerned. It has been argued, at least in 
the context of the accountability principle, that transparency is a synonym for abso-
lute openness.
3 Transparency requires, however, considering the trade-off between 
openness, when the central bank does not filter away any information, and clarity,
when the central bank does not disclose information that would make it difficult for 
recipients to understand the core message (Winkler, 2000), (Blinder et al., 2001), and 
(IMF, 2006). Thus, disclosure of additional information may compromise the clarity 
of the analytical or policy message. For example, the public may get confused when 
minutes from a meeting are published together with an inflation report and the two 
documents emphasize different economic risks and new information may introduce 
inconsistencies into the established communication regime (IMF, 2006).  
We argue that policymakers need to ensure all three dimensions of transparen-
2 An example of a costly communication failure is Thailand in the second half of 2006 (Bank of Thailand,
2006). Although the core inflation forecast pointed safely toward the midpoint of the target band (2 per-
cent), the central bank kept the short term rate high at almost 5 percent, prompting massive carry trade
inflows. The central bank eventually resorted to capital controls to stem these flows, prompting a major
stock market correction. 
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cy: (i) clarity, (ii) timeliness, and (iii) openness. In our view the clarity of the informa-
tion to be conveyed to the public determines the success or failure of communication 
under inflation targeting, as the timeliness and volume of information are not really 
a constraint in the internet age. We define all three dimensions more carefully below. 
Clear communication requires that the various communication tools send sig-
nals that are consistent with each other and well coordinated. With the large variety 
of communication tools available, coordination of the message across the tools is cru-
cial. For example, if the inflation report dwells on upward forecast risks and simul-
taneously the inflation forecast is below target, the public is likely to be confused as 
to what future monetary policy is going to be no matter how much additional in-
formation supporting both messages is going to be disclosed. In other words, some-
times less can be more. 
Open  communication p rovides  the public  with  just  enough  information  to 
understand past economic developments and the future direction of monetary policy. 
The best practices with respect to inflation reports, minutes of meetings, and fore-
casting models have been established (Blinder, 2001), and (IMF, 2006). 
Timely communication helps the public to understand the monetary stance in 
a policy-relevant time horizon. Central bank researchers have stressed the usefulness 
of publishing complete forecasting models regularly, given heterogeneous informa-
tion among agents, in order to influence expectations of those agents who use simpler 
models (Akram et al., 2006), and (Fukaþ, 2006). All relevant information needs to be 
disclosed as soon as possible and certainly prior to the next monetary policy meeting. 
All the information that is disclosed with longer lags is useful mainly for accoun-
tability and research purposes. 
But even if the message is clear, should all policymakers speak with one 
voice? Coordination of communication among Bank Board members can be done in 
two ways, each of which has its pros and cons (Šmídková, 2005). First, some central 
banks prefer to form a consensus and communicate with one voice in order to em-
phasize the main message (the European Central Bank or Bank of Canada). However, 
the consensual approach does not allow the public to fully understand the internal di-
versity of the views, which could be used to approximate the uncertainty of monetary 
decision making. Second, some central banks vote on policy interest rates and disclose 
the voting pattern to the public in order to draw attention to uncertainty. In such case, 
however, the central message can be more difficult to extract. 
We will assess the recent Czech experience using all three dimensions of trans-
parency outlined above. Our benchmark for open, and to some extent also for timely, 
communication can be derived from the previously published work. The theoretical 
literature has recommended what types of information should be disclosed to the public 
and when. Regarding the former, the inflation forecast was initially the centre of at-
tention (Geraats, 2001). More recently, a whole set of information that should be dis-
closed in a timely manner has been defined, such as data, forecasts, models, minutes, 
and evaluations of past policy actions (Woodford, 2005, ), (Eijffinnger, Geraats, 2006). 
Regarding the latter, “timely” is typically assumed to correspond to “prior to the next 
meeting”. Comparative studies complement the theoretical literature and provide more 
detailed guidance; see, for example, (Heenan et al., 2006). It turns out that successful 
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As far as clarity of communication is concerned, the existing literature offers 
fewer clues. We suggest that the true clarity test is an assessment of the understand-
ing of monetary policy by the public in the context of the inflation targeting frame-
work using various communication tools. A successful central bank is understood by 
the public, whereas an unsuccessful bank is not. Volume or detail of information di-
vulged by the central bank is a side issue in this context. To this end, we compute and 
compare three measures of the risks that alternative communication tools contribute 
to the central message. 
3. Openness and Timeliness in Communication: The Czech Case 
In this section, we assess the openness and timeliness of the CNB’s commu-
nication strategy using well-defined benchmarks. The CNB employs the following 
communication tools to explain its monetary policy decisions and its views on eco-
nomic developments: press releases, press conferences, interviews with Board mem-
bers, minutes of meetings, inflation reports, seminars for financial market analysts, 
articles by CNB staff in various media, situation reports, internal protocols, and occa-
sional
4 and research publications. Each of these communication tools has its specific 
content, audience and timing. All communications, with the exception of “historical” 
materials, are issued simultaneously in Czech and English. Our list is ordered along 
the timeliness nexus of CNB communication. 
3.1 Day 1 
The first information about the outcome of a monetary policy meeting (which 
the CNB issues in a matter of minutes) is a press release on the CNB website. This 
states the current level of policy interest rates and the distribution of the votes within 
the Board.
5 The targeted audience comprises journalists and analysts. While the former 
need to prepare for the subsequent press conference, the latter use this information 
for their work on the financial markets. 
The second communication tools employed are press conferences of the CNB 
governor. These are organized for journalists in the afternoon following the monetary 
policy meeting. The information content is broader than that of the press release, and, on 
a quarterly basis, when a new inflation report is prepared, the governor presents the in-
flation forecast. Alternatively, the governor comments on the latest data and their impli-
cations for the risks of the forecast in the interim period between two quarterly fore-
casts. The governor also discusses the unanimity of the voting (or the lack thereof) and 
comments on the distribution of the votes for alternative policy rate movements. 
The presentations prepared for the press conferences are available on the CNB website.
6
3.2 Day 1 to 8 
After the press conference, the individual Board members give interviews to 
the media, explaining the reasons behind the decisions and highlighting specific risks.
7
4 O ccasional  policy  publications  are  produced  following  an update  of  the CNB’s  inflation  targeting 
strategy – see http://www.cnb.cz/en/publications/. 
5 Policy meetings currently take place on the last Thursday of each month. Starting January 2008 the CNB 
will hold only eight such meetings a year (CNB, 2007). 
6 See http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/bank_board_minutes/. Starting in mid-2007, the press con-
ferences have been recorded and .mp3 files are downloadable from the Czech version of the CNB website: 
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Since the initial press release does not mention the voting of the individual Board 
members, these interviews typically do not contain individual assessments of the mo-
netary  policy  risks.  The targeted  audience  is  comparatively  broad,  and  both  spe-
cialized media readers and the general public can access the interviews on the CNB 
website after they have been published in the media.  
3.3 Day 8 
Eight days after the meeting the CNB publishes the minutes of the mone-
tary policy meeting. These contain a brief summary of the staff presentation given 
to the Board members during the policy meeting.
8 Each quarter, one of these presen-
tations focuses on the new inflation forecast and the two interim presentations focus 
on new information and implied risks to the forecast. A major part of the minutes is 
devoted to the Board debate following the staff presentation. The minutes emphasize 
those parts of the presentation that were commented on by Board members and de-
scribe which additional risks were considered. The minutes clearly indicate when 
Board members disagreed either with the forecast or with the relevance of the fore-
cast risks. The potential audience is again broad, since access to the website is unre-
stricted and the minutes use nontechnical language. 
On a quarterly basis, inflation reports are published eight days after the mone-
tary policy meeting together with the minutes.
9 The inflation report is a forward- 
-looking document that describes the new forecast together with the new data used in 
the forecast, thus containing substantially more data than the other communications 
mentioned so far. Given its focus on the “central story” behind the forecast, the report 
contains less information on the risks attached to this forecast than, say, the minutes. 
Inflation reports are presented to analysts at special seminars, which give an oppor-
tunity to present the forecasting mechanism in greater detail. In addition, analysts have 
a chance to ask questions clarifying certain parts of the report or minutes. 
3.4 Beyond Day 8 
Inflation reports are usually complemented with articles by CNB staff in 
the media. These summarize the key features of the new inflation forecast and inte-
resting partial analyses. They typically do not contain any additional economic infor-
mation as compared to the inflation report, but they use less technical language in 
order to disseminate the message to a wider audience. In addition, these articles in-
form the public about which CNB experts specialize in which particular topics. 
3.5 After 6 Years 
Six years after the meeting, the CNB discloses two documents that were ini-
tially produced for internal purposes. First, situation reports are background docu-
ments prepared by CNB staff prior to each monetary policy meeting. In comparison 
7 The board members have agreed not to give interviews in the one week preceding monetary policy
meetings. See http://www.cnb.cz/en/media_service/interviews/.  
8 See http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/bank_board_minutes/.  
9 See http://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/inflation_reports/. A hard copy of the report is sent to various
target groups, such as journalists, analysts, economists in academia, and members of parliament. The go-
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to the publicly available inflation reports, the situation reports contain more detailed in-
formation and are prepared monthly. Second, internal protocols are internal documents 
prepared by CNB staff after each monetary policy meeting. In comparison to the mi-
nutes, the protocol provides a full transcript of the meeting, including the names of 
the Board members. Unlike the other documents, situation reports and internal proto-
cols are available in Czech only. These documents will be made available on the web-
site as from 2008. 
3.6 Irregular Frequency 
The CNB regularly communicates changes to its inflation targeting strategy, 
such as changes to the targeted index or to the policy instruments. These are an-
nounced at a press conference and published on the CNB website. Changes in mo-
netary policy strategy are often explained in  accompanying policy documents of 
the CNB – see (CNB, 2004), or (CNB, 2007).  
The CNB also produces research publications that provide additional infor-
mation  about  its  inflation  targeting  strategy.  For  example,  each  new  forecasting 
model is made publicly available with a short lag. About one-half of the regularly 
published in-house research papers deal directly or indirectly with the CNB fore-
casting mechanism.
10 The potential audience is restricted to CNB watchers and aca-
demic researchers, as these publications use technical language. 
The above communication tools, their characteristics, and comparisons vis-à- 
-vis international benchmarks are summarized in Table 1. The CNB instantly com-
municates three major pieces of information on its website: (i) the outcome of the mo-
netary policy meeting, (ii) either its new quarterly forecast or its assessment of new 
data in the interim period, and (iii) verbal descriptions of shocks/risks attached to its 
central forecast. Within one week, additional information is disclosed about the fore-
cast, the new data and the risks, allowing CNB watchers to improve their understanding 
of monetary policy before the next monetary policy meeting. Detailed information on 
the forecasting system is occasionally disclosed when the system is significantly modi-
fied. For the most patient CNB watchers, the bank eventually discloses full transcripts 
of the meetings as well as full background documents. However, this detailed and 
Czech-only information is only of interest to academic researchers for the purposes of 
long-term monetary policy analysis, and these readers lie outside our definition of trans-
parency of central bank communication. 
The following information can be learned from CNB communication: (i) the out-
come of the monetary policy meeting, that is, the new level of policy rates; (ii) the in-
flation forecast; (iii) a verbal description of the risks by staff, which complements 
the central forecast; and (iv) the distribution of the votes, reflecting the diversity (un-
certainty) of views among the policymakers.
11 All CNB communication tools out-
lining the inflation outcome and forecast are carefully coordinated, including the po-
licymakers’ views summarized in the votes, minutes, and interviews. 
10 See http://www.cnb.cz/www.cnb.cz/en/research/research_publications/cnb_wp/index.html. 
11 It is worth mentioning that the CNB has worked with an unconditional inflation forecast since 2002; see
(Kotlán, Navrátil, 2003). However, the inflation forecasts deviated significantly from the target in about
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To sum up, the CNB communicates a lot and in a timely manner. All four 
types  of  information  identified  in  the benchmark  studies  as  important  for  trans-
parency are disclosed in timely manner through various channels. Compared to 
the communication strategies of other central banks, the CNB ranks well and, indeed, 
it seems more open than suggested by most of the benchmarks (Eijffinnger, Geraats, 
2006), (Heenan et al., 2006), (Fracasso et al., 2003), and (Jarmuzek et al., 2004). 
4. Assessing Clarity in Communication: A Suggested Methodology 
This section examines the third dimension of transparency of communication, 
namely clarity. In this assessment we are left on our own, with no empirical studies to 
compare our results to. Clarity in our approach means that the various communication 
tools are well coordinated and that the central message is not polluted by contradic-
tions. Should it contain contradictions or biases, or both, the public would not be able to 
understand monetary policy actions, and the credibility of monetary policy would be 
harmed (Rozkut, 2007). We hasten to add that contradictions are different from policy 
or forecast uncertainty – the policymaker should avoid the former, while he should com-
municate the latter through, for example, the voting pattern or policymaker interviews. 
We suggest one possible way of measuring clarity in communication, and in 
doing so, we face two challenges. First, we must select the most important pieces of 
information in order to assess clarity. We argue that the three selected indicators – 
implied risk, comprehensive risk, and the uncertainty indicator – provide a good first- 
-guess approximation of what the educated public would like to understand. Second, 
we must convert verbal information into numerical data. This conversion is naturally 
prone to judgment bias and measurement error, but we see no easier way of extract-
ing the relevant information from the inflation reports. It could be argued that if we 
misunderstood the information, so would the markets. 
Major obstacles to communication clarity are contradictions among the mea-
sures of forecast risks that the public can deduce from the alternative communication 
tools.  For  example,  the public  can  use  the inflation  target,  inflation  forecast,  and 
observed policy interest rates to compute a forecast risk of inflation and compare it 
with the verbal description of the risks listed in the inflation report. If these measures 
contradict each other, the public cannot easily understand the central bank’s deci-
sions. The central bank perhaps wanted to be open about disagreements between staff 
and policymakers or about forecast uncertainty, but such openness may have came at 
the expense of clarity of communication. Crystal clear communication, in contrast, 
implies that all measures of the forecast risks point in one direction, ensuring that 
monetary policy actions as well as economic developments are understood easily. In 
other words, all communication tools were aligned and the message was clear. 
Clarity of communication can be evaluated by comparing the three types of 
forecast risk extractable from central banks’ communication. First, one can compute 
the implied risk from the inflation forecast, inflation target, and policy interest rates. 
The implied risk approximates the forecast risk – upward or downward with respect 
to the forecast – identified by the policymakers during the policy meeting. Second, 
by scrutinizing inflation reports one can construct a comprehensive risk indicator. 
The comprehensive risk indicator reflects which types of risks – again upward or 
downward  –  were  emphasized  verbally  by  the staff  in  the inflation  report,  trans-
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pattern can be used to compute an uncertainty indicator. The voting is typically close 
if the uncertainty about future developments is high, because policymakers do not ne-
cessarily share the same views.
12 To illustrate the point, let us assume that the central 
inflation forecast shows inflation close to the target and that four policymakers vote 
for keeping interest rates unchanged and three for reducing them. The presence of 
three dissenters suggests downward risks to the inflation forecast. 
The public can get confused, however, by comparing the different measures of 
risks contained in the individual communication tools. For example, the comprehen-
sive risk (verbal assessment-based), reflecting the views of the staff, can differ from 
the implied risk (target- or forecast-based). Moreover, policymakers view forecast 
risks  differently  from  the staff,  because  their  information  set i s  d i fferent.  Also, 
the distribution  of  the votes  may  send  a confusing  signal  that  there  is  a large un-
certainty when in reality policymakers held a strong minority view, resulting in a bi- 
-modal distribution of the votes, such as 4:3 or 3:2. We admit that monetary policy 
communication is unlikely to be crystal clear, or perfectly coordinated, under every 
combination of shocks, but it can be “clear enough” by clearing up the contradictions 
between, say, the implied and comprehensive risk through the uncertainty indicator. 
4.1 A Methodology for Risk Calculation 
We propose computing the three above measures of forecast risks in the fol-
lowing way. The implied risk is the difference between the published inflation forecast 
and the forecast the public would derive from a simple forward-looking policy rule, 
based  on  the inflation  target,  the inflation  forecast,  and  the current  and  equilibrium 
level of interest rates.
13 We use a policy rule analogous to the rule designed by Batini 
and Haldane (1999) and applied in previous studies dealing with the Czech Republic 
(Mahadeva, Šmídková, 2001). A positive/negative implied risk, that is, the published 
forecast lower/higher than the implied forecast, indicates that policy-makers attached 
some upward/downward risks to the central forecast during the horizon of the forecast 
and tightened/loosened monetary policy accordingly (Bernanke, Woodford, 1997).  
The Batini-Haldane rule, in which the policy rate depends only on the devi-
ation of forecasted inflation from the target, possesses a key attribute of simplicity 
and as such it seems to be a reasonable approximation of what the public might think 
about the central bank’s reaction function. The public certainly expects higher policy 
rates if future inflation is seen above the target. The rule’s simplicity is also its short-
coming: the public knows that policymakers are rarely “inflation nutters”, focusing 
solely on inflation. Although the public is unlikely to trust the Batini-Haldane rule 
12 It could happen, of course, that the individual Board members create a homogeneous group with
an identical set of preferences. We see this as a highly hypothetical counterfactual example. 




+1) + R*),  where  R i s  
the policy rate, J is the smoothing coefficient, G measures the aggressiveness of monetary policy towards 
the inflation target, S
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+1 is the policy-rule-based inflation forecast, S
T
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levant period, and R* is the equilibrium interest rate computed as the real equilibrium rate and the inflation
target. By rearranging the policy rule one obtains an expression for the policy-rule-based inflation forecast, 
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+1). A significant differential between these two forecasts would indicate that there were some risks









+1) > 0. In other words, the central bank increased 
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completely, it would seem equally unreasonable to assume that the public would run 
a complex forecasting model with additional difficult-to-measure variables just check 
that the central bank bases its decision on one such model, too. The public would 
rather rely on the inflation-report, verbal assessments to clarify the rule-based under-
standing of policy decisions.  
The comprehensive risk aggregates verbal indicators of expected demand, sup-
ply and external shocks. We perused the quarterly inflation reports, reporting all verbal 
assessments and the presumed direction of their impact on inflation. Each shock is 
given an equal weight, because the inflation reports do not provide information on 
the shocks’ quantitative importance. To this end, shocks expected to push inflation 
higher are denoted as 1, whereas shocks expected to push inflation lower are denoted 
as –1. All shocks are then aggregated across categories and we obtain an index-like 
measure of what the policymakers thought of the implied risks in any given quarter (see 
Figure 1 for the aggregate measure in the upper panel and a disaggregated measure in 
the lower panel). This index is then compared with the implied inflation risks obtained 
earlier. The comprehensive risk is negative/positive if the inflation report mentions 
only downward/upward inflation shocks or if the sum of all shocks points in one di-
rection. The measure can be inconclusive if it lists both downward and upward inflation 
shocks and the sum thereof is equal to zero. We were able to identify on average six 
shocks in each quarterly report or 24 shocks per year. From the chart we deduce that 
the from early 2001 the comprehensive risk was pointing mostly toward declining inf-
lation, that is, the policymakers observed mostly downward inflation shocks. Moreover, 
the brunt of these shocks was coming from the external side. 
Finally, the uncertainty indicator captures the minority voice among the poli-
cymakers, giving us a measure of the forecast uncertainty (see  the Appendix for 
quantitative estimates).
14 In the case of a unanimous vote, policymakers express no 
significant forecast uncertainty. In contrast, if four members vote to keep rates un-
changed and three members vote to increase them, we interpret this as considerable 
uncertainty expressed by the policymakers, pointing towards upward risks. While 
the previous two measures of forecast risks are available only quarterly, the uncer-
tainty indicator can be computed on a monthly basis, given the monthly frequency of 
monetary policy meetings and the quarterly frequency of inflation forecasts and re-
ports. To keep the quarterly frequency, we compute the quarterly values of the uncer-
tainty risks by summing the monthly values in that quarter. 
5. Clarity in Communication: The Czech Case 
We apply the above methodology to Czech data by computing the three mea-
sures of risk on a quarterly basis for the five years (2001–2005) during which the CNB 
targeted a horizontal inflation target. We take into account two time horizons relevant 
for monetary policy (one and two years ahead). Our data sources are the CNB inflation 
reports (CNB, 1999–2005), from which we take forecasts, actual data, and verbal de-
scriptions of shocks and risks to obtain estimates of the comprehensive risk. We use 
the minutes of monetary policy meetings to compute the uncertainty indicator.  
14 It shows the percentage of the votes that were in the minority with respect to the actual decision taken
(the percentage of those present). For example, if six votes supported unchanged rates and one vote sup-
ported an increase (decrease), the uncertainty indicator takes a value of 14 % (–14 %). Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    551
We are aware of potential measurement errors in our computations – we may 
have either misunderstood or misinterpreted the verbal description of the shock. To this 
end, we perform two robustness checks. First, the implied risk – the difference between 
the published inflation forecast and the forecast the public would derive from a simple 
forward-looking policy rule – is treated as significant only if it is larger than one per-
centage point, that is, the width of the CNB inflation target. Comprehensive risk is sig-
nificant if it is different from zero by more than one, that is, by more than the average 
value of the sum of the shocks. The uncertainty indicator is significant if two or more 
of the seven-member Board form a minority view.
15 Second, we conduct a robustness 
analysis in order to see the impact of parameter changes in the policy rule on the values 
of  the implied  risk.  The quarterly  values  of  these  three  measures  are  reported  in 
the Appendix.
FIGURE 1  The Czech National Bank: A Measure of Comprehensive Risk 
Source: CNB inflation reports; authors’ calculations 
Note: Positive values of the comprehensive risk record frequency of current period developments pointing
toward higher inflation in the period ahead, while negative values of the comprehensive risk record fre-
quency of developments pointing toward lower inflation.552                             Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12
We now come to deciding when communication is clear and when it is con-
fusing. With the three risk indicators computed, we can assess whether the indicators 
have spoken with one voice or one of them “explains” the discrepancy. First, com-
munication is considered to be clear when all three measures point in the same di-
rection – upward, downward, or zero risk. Second, communication is also regarded 
as clear when two indicators (typically the implied and comprehensive risks) dis-
agree, but the third one (typically the uncertainty indicator) clarifies that the initial 
discrepancy is due to forecast uncertainty. For example, if the inflation report points 
to significant upward risks, the actual decision points to significant downward risks 
and the minority voted for a policy rate increase, we would argue that the third mea-
sure of risk is explanatory, building a bridge between the first two measures. In con-
trast, communication is considered to be confusing if the individual measures point in 
different directions and none of them plays a corrective role.  
We argue that the above concept of clarity corresponds to the way the public 
works with the three measures of risk. For example, if the inflation forecast is above 
the inflation target and at the same time interest rates are cut, the public will un-
derstand that there is an implied downward inflation risk relative to the forecast that 
was identified by policymakers during their meeting. The public would be confused, 
however, if either the inflation report identified strong upward inflation risks or 
a strong minority voted to keep rates unchanged (or to increase them), thus signaling 
uncertainty. 
The basic summary of our results shows that CNB communication was clear 
in most cases (Table 2). On average, and taking into account the robustness analyses, 
all three risk indicators spoke with one voice in about 65–70 percent of all cases, 
while in the rest of the cases the message was not clear, creating a potentially con-
fusing policy message. We put stress on the qualifier “potentially” – there are good 
reasons for the three measures of risk to deviate. For example, if supply shocks are 
large and their impact on prices is uncertain, the three measures of risk are likely to 
deviate. Dennis and Williams (2007) suggest that under such conditions, high trans-
parency of monetary policy may not be beneficial.  
The robustness analyses confirm that our results are not particularly sensitive 
to changes in the policy-rule parameters. It is also worth noting that communication 
appears to be somewhat clearer for the one-year horizon as compared to the two-year 
horizon. This may imply that CNB monetary policy is focused mostly on the fol-
lowing four quarters, consistent with the declared monetary policy transmission ho-
rizon of 4–6 quarters, and that the existing communication tools reflect that. 
We further disaggregate our results from Table 2 into four and three cases of 
clear and unclear communication, respectively. First, our exercise suggests that obvious 
cases of confusion have been rare (Table 3). Strong cases of confusion, that is, when 
different signals were sent by the implied and comprehensive risks, and in which 
the voting  of  a minority  of  the members  of  the monetary  policy  body  did  not  play 
an explanatory  role,  were  identified  in  only  about  one-tenth  of a ll  observations  for 
the one-year horizon. Moreover, we expect the public to get somewhat confused when 
a risk measure is insignificant but the uncertainty indicator does not play an expla- 
15 If fewer members were present, we consider the uncertainty indicator significant if the minority is more
than 14 % of the votes. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    553
natory role, and very confused when the implied and comprehensive risks differ and 
the uncertainty indicator does not play an explanatory role. 
Communication has been is crystal clear when all three measures of risk are 
consistent or the uncertainty indicator is insignificant and the CNB has behaved so in 
about one-quarter of all cases. In addition, communication has been clear enough in 
another two-fifths of all cases, the other three cases of clarity involving situations 
where either one measure of risk is insignificant or the uncertainty indicator plays 
an explanatory role.  
6. Final Remarks 
Our empirical exercise using the CNB’s communication tools shows just how 
difficult it is to measure the quality of communication, despite the abundant theore-
tical literature on transparency. The earlier literature has put a lot of emphasis on 
openness, whereas more recent papers have introduced the concept of multi-dimen-
sional transparency, which includes openness timeliness as well as clarity. The empi-
rical assessments of transparency have focused almost exclusively on the volume of 
information disclosed and its timeliness. Those studies which have looked at the qua-
lity of communication have assessed only one communication tool, not the whole 
communication strategy and its tools. 
We argue that central bank communication needs to be assessed along three 
dimensions: openness, timeliness, and clarity, with the ultimate goal of making mo-
netary policy easy to understand; and we apply this approach to the Czech National 
TABLE 2  Czech National Bank: How Clear Communication Was in 2001–2005 
Communication was: 
Clear  Unclear 
Benchmark policy rule  1Y forecasts  70 %  30 % 
2Y forecasts  65 %  35 % 
Inflation aversion  1Y forecasts  65 %  35 % 
(higher į) 2Y forecasts  60 %  40 % 
Intense interest rate smoothing  1Y forecasts  75 %  25 % 
(higher Ȗ) 2Y forecasts  70 %  30 % 
1Y forecasts  75 %  25 %  Convergence-country equilibrium 
rates (higher R*) 2Y forecasts  75 %  25 % 




Benchmark rule  0.3 2 2
Inflation aversion  0.3 3 2
Intense interest rate smoothing  0.5 2 2
Convergence-country equilibrium 
rate  0.3 2 3
Note: The table reports cases in which communication was clear and cases in which the public could get con-
fused (in % of all 20 observations). Results are reported for two policy horizons. Outcomes of robust-
ness analyses are presented for alternative parameters in the policy rule: 




+1) + R*), where R is the policy rate, J is the smoothing coefficient, G mea-
sures the aggressiveness of monetary policy toward the inflation target, S
F
+1 is the policy-rule-based in-
flation forecast, S
T
+1 is the inflation target in the relevant period, and R* is the equilibrium policy rate, 
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Bank’s procedures and data. The first two dimensions – openness and timeliness – are 
relatively easy to assess using the available benchmarks and we were able to ascer-
tain that the CNB communicates its monetary policy decisions openly and in a timely 
manner. In any case, these benchmarks are relatively easy to meet: at present central 
banks can disseminate large volumes of information very fast. We doubt, however, 
that the volume and speed of communication are sufficient conditions for under-
standing the economy and monetary stance. 
The third dimension – clarity of communication – is significantly more dif-
ficult to define and assess, with no suitable benchmarks in the literature. To this end, 
we introduce a new methodology for assessing clarity of communication by com-
paring three measures of forecast risk derived from central bank communication. If 
these three measures – the implied and comprehensive risks, and uncertainty – either 
speak with one voice or at least complement and explain each other, communication 
is said to be crystal clear and clear enough, respectively. If these measures contradict 
each other, communication is said to lack clarity. We find CNB communication to be 
very clear in two – thirds to three – quarters of all cases for the one-year and two- 
-year policy horizons and for alternative policy rules. 
TABLE 3  The Czech National Bank: Detailed Results 
Clarity of communication 
(From the strongest to the weakest case) 
Extent to which the public could 
get confused (From the weakest to 


































































































20 %  5 %  35 %  5 %  10 %  10 %  15 % 
Note: The table breaks down our communication results into several categories on a scale of clarity and con-
fusion. Each category describes the degree of consistency of the three measures of risk (implied risk, 
comprehensive risk, uncertainty indicator). For example, we say that communication was crystal clear if 
all three measures of risk point in the same direction (or two risks point in the same direction and 
the uncertainty indicator is insignificant). Alternatively, we say that communication could lead to confu-
sion if the implied and comprehensive risks pointed in the opposite direction (one in the upward di-
rection, one in the downward direction) and the uncertainty indicator did not play an explanatory role 
(pointing in the opposite direction than the implied risk). The results report the relative importance of 
each category (in percent of all 20 observations) for the two policy horizons. The entries for each fore-
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